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Abstract 
 
The transformation of production processes that occurred across a range of manufacturing 
industries during the Industrial Age generated new and more complex requirements for the 
process of intermediation as well as for the production systems themselves. The development 
of hierarchical organizations provided firms with the ability to oversee directly many of these 
new tasks and to create markets that supported them. In contrast, the advent of the 
Information Age has tended not so much to require the creation of markets de novo but has 
rather altered the nature of existing relationships of intermediation in ways that have 
facilitated a much wider collection of organizational forms.  
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to Technological Change in the Processed Foods Sector 1 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Just as the late nineteenth century witnessed the decisive transition from the Commercial to 
the Industrial Age, so the closing years of the twentieth century have seen full flowering of 
the era that is now increasingly understood to constitute the Information Age (Chandler, 
2000).  The process of digital convergence (Yoffie, 1997) spanning the telecommunications 
and information processing industries has created an information infrastructure which, in the 
years to come, will leave few areas of economic activity unaffected.  Already industries such 
as textiles and apparel have been significantly restructured as a direct outcome of the novel 
systems of information management provided by the new information and communication 
technologies (ICT) (Abernathy et al, 1999).  Two of the activities in which changes wrought 
by ICT developments have been felt most acutely involve systems of supply chain 
management (Hill, 2000) and consumer-driven forms of product development (Harvey, 
2000). 
 Whilst the full implications of ICT for the future shape of economic systems remain a 
matter for conjecture, an analysis of those vanguard industries where significant change has 
already taken place illustrate two common trends that have emerged.  On the one hand, firms 
employing the new ICT methods have displayed a tendency towards more networked forms 
of organization (Nolan, 2000), whilst on the other, a shift has been evident in the relative 
bargaining power of firms along the value chain moving away from producers towards 
buyers (Gereffi, 1994; Dicken, 1998; Dobson, Waterson and Chu, 1998).  These 
developments have been founded on the ability of firms to make available products and 
services that are tailored much more closely to individual consumer requirements and, as a 
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result, have created innovative, value-enhanced commodities that sell for premium prices. 
 Of course, value enhancement of products is not a new phenomenon.  The impact of 
technical change in the Industrial Age also facilitated opportunities for adding value, but did 
so within what was overwhelmingly a process of commodity standardisation and mass 
production.  In comparing the two epochs, therefore, it is particularly instructive to consider a 
case study in which the organizational implications of value-adding product innovation can 
be directly contrasted.  One such case in point is that offered by the ready-prepared meals 
industry within the United Kingdom.  These meals originally constituted part of the 
development of frozen foods that made up one of the key Industrial Age innovations within 
the expanding area of food processing.  Since the 1980s, however, an important segment of 
ready meal production has switched to more varied, chilled versions of the good.  Although 
in many respects this represents a relatively modest step in terms of product development, the 
actual impact of the change for the food processing industry value chain has been 
revolutionary because such a shift has been made possible only by virtue of the introduction 
of ICT processes and their linked organizational responses.  And whilst many of the 
developments identified in this particular case have also been evident outside of the United 
Kingdom, for example in the supply-chain management strategies of retailers such as Wal-
Mart (Gill and Abend, 1996), the specific conditions that arose within the food processing 
and retailing chain in Britain from the 1960s has meant that it is in this location that the ICT-
generated changes in ready-meal product development appear to have had their greatest 
impact. 
 In identifying the salient features of this transition, our paper proceeds as follows.  In 
Section 2 the framework of technological change and organizational evolution developed by 
Chandler (1977; 1990) is considered from the perspective of institutional economics and the 
recent critique of transactions costs set out by Casson (1997b).  In this critique it is argued 
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that the role of the firm as an intermediary or co-ordinator is best understood in relation to its 
function as a processor of information.  Such a perspective is then adopted to analyse long-
run changes in the organization of the value chain within the U.K. food processing industry.  
Section 3 traces the development of frozen food as a continuous-process innovation of the 
kind typical of the Second Industrial Revolution and shows how large food manufacturers 
used a strategy of vertical integration to manage the value-adding chain and create missing 
markets.  Section 4 argues that in the 1960s and 1970s this process of vertical integration was 
reversed as U.K. food retailers grew in power and as new opportunities to develop frozen 
food products arose.  Section 5 illustrates the way in which high-street retailers, led in the 
1980s by the up-market food and clothing retail chain Marks & Spencer (M&S), were able to 
utilise innovations in supply-chain management to satisfy an existing, but latent, demand for 
high value-added chilled ready meals.  To do so, two contrasting types of inter-firm networks 
were employed: one that can be termed control-based that was used to manage the co-
ordination of the supply chain; the other of which was innovation-based and designed to pool 
sources of knowledge among food manufacturers, packaging firms and grocery retailers in 
order to exploit opportunities for new product development.  Section 6 concludes by arguing 
that the inter-temporal comparative case study provided by the U.K. food processing industry 
serves as an instructive example of the emerging relationship between the ICT technologies 
and network-based organizational structures that are emerging as intrinsic features of the 
Information Age. 
2. Information and Organization 
 
Frozen food was an outcome of the technologies of the Second Industrial Revolution in 
which scientific breakthroughs in the production process allowed for the development of 
continuous-process forms of manufacturing and the creation of various new products whose 
common characteristic was their standardisation. Frozen food was part of the revolution in 
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branded, packaged consumer goods that relied on the introduction of proprietary technologies 
in food processing and allied developments in packaging. As Chandler (1977; 1990) has 
shown, these developments in technology tended to be exploited most successfully when they 
were coupled with the growth of business enterprises that featured extensive governance 
structures and some degree of vertical integration. 
 In the case of chilled ready meals, by contrast, the main driving force has been the 
development of non-proprietary technologies in information management. Unlike the case of 
frozen foods, the development of chilled ready meals utilised established technologies of 
food preservation and distribution channels, but their successful commercial exploitation 
opened up new and complex logistical questions due to the relatively short shelf life of the 
products, and necessitated a reversion to forms of manufacturing based on batch rather than 
continuous process production methods. These factors meant that in order to realise the 
potentially high levels of added value in production, the matching of supply and demand over 
relatively short time periods became crucial and this, in turn, required detailed attention to 
supply chain management and inventory control systems. Thus, chilled ready meals 
constitute an example of the type of product which has been spawned by the Information 
Age. Because the role played by proprietary production technologies was much smaller and 
the role of information management much greater, it has been the market-making retailers 
rather than manufacturing firms who have emerged as the leading element in the 
development of chilled ready meals. As a corollary, the organizational response has tended to 
involve far less by way of integrated management within a single firm and a much more 
important role for inter-firm networking arrangements. 
 In studying the relationship between technical change and organizational form Alfred D. 
Chandler‟s work has provided business historians with a most fruitful framework of analysis. 
For him, the multiunit, multifunctional business enterprises that evolved in the United States 
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after 1880, in parallel with the technical changes of the Second Industrial Revolution, 
represented the critical organizational response for the successful transformation to a modern, 
mass production-based, industrial economy. By investing in advanced methods of production, 
by organizing management systems in order to control the increased volumes of throughput, 
and by assuming greater responsibility for generating sales, these new business enterprises 
sharply raised the efficiency and productivity of the American economy as a whole vis a vis 
its foreign competitors (Chandler, Amatori and Hikino, 1997). 
 Here an attempt is made to apply Chandler‟s ideas (1977; Chandler and Daems, 1980) to 
the growth of the market for frozen food and then to assess their utility as a means of 
explaining the forms of economic organization that have emerged with the development of a 
market for chilled ready meals. In revisiting Chandler‟s earlier work, however, account is 
taken of the critique that has been levelled at the framework of institutional economics upon 
which his work has drawn. The Coasian (Coase, 1937) conceptualisation of transactions cost 
as the factor motivating the growth of the firm, extended through the work of Williamson 
(1975; 1985), has focused attention on the role of firms in subsuming markets and has, in 
consequence, led to firms and markets being viewed as alternative systems of economic co-
ordination. Under such conditions, the boundaries of the firm are defined in relation to the set 
of activities, or resource flows, that the firm takes direct responsibility for managing. This 
notion of the firm as being defined in terms of its management of internalised market 
transactions – i.e. in ownership terms – displays fundamental limitations when confronted 
with forms of organization that involve inter-firm networks or long term collaborations. In 
these cases, co-ordination of resources takes place across the ownership boundaries of 
individual firms but not under the anonymous conditions posited in conventional theories of 
the price mechanism. 
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 In reviewing the limitations of institutional economics, Casson (1997a; 1997b) has 
suggested that greater emphasis needs to be placed on the role of intermediation in defining 
the fundamental role of the firm.
2
 Since the ability of an institution to effect the process of 
intermediation is dependent upon the gathering, management and dissemination of various 
types of information, this reorientation allows Casson to argue that the traditional concept of 
transactions costs needs to placed into the broader context of information costs.3 This notion 
of the firm, as information dependent and constrained, leads Casson to suggest that an 
approach to institutional economics based on information costs will provide the key to 
specifying the true nature of the firm: allowing both its internal activities and external 
relations to be considered within the same methodological framework. Further, Casson points 
out that the institutional structure of an economy will evolve in response to the changes in 
information costs over time, thus affecting not only the growth of individual firms but also 
the way in which these firms relate to their customers, their suppliers and their competitors. 
How, then, do these ideas regarding information costs relate to the development of frozen 
foods and chilled ready meals? 
3. Development of the Market for Frozen Food in Britain 
 
The development of frozen food occurred in two phases. The first phase, beginning in the 
1930s, involved the introduction of quick-freezing as a method of food preservation which 
could be applied with particular success to white fish and certain green vegetables. In this 
phase, the use of quick freezing as a method of food preservation carried many parallels to 
that of high-speed canning which had been applied to other foodstuffs in the 1880s. In each 
case, the use of packaging facilitated the introduction of proprietary branded goods which 
were supported by extensive advertising. The second phase moved beyond the simple 
preservation of foodstuffs into more innovative forms of product development. In Britain 
from the mid 1950s manufacturers of frozen foods, led by the Unilever subsidiary Birds Eye, 
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began to introduce a range of value added products such as fishfingers, beefburgers and 
frozen ready meals (Reader, 1963; 1980; Wilson, 1968). 
 Although the earliest applications of freezing technology to food preservation were 
designed to serve the catering trade, towards the end of the Second World War Unilever 
gained control of the Birds Eye subsidiary of the American General Foods corporation
4
 and 
began to develop a market in frozen foodstuffs for final consumers. This innovation built 
directly on the experience of Unilever in the mass production of branded packaged consumer 
goods upon which the company had built its reputation. At this time, the company was one of 
a small number of non-American firms to have developed an extensive management 
structure, with its British-based operation featuring four product divisions (soap, margarine, 
oil mills and food) overarched by a range of advisory and service departments which served 
the entire range of the company‟s international subsidiaries.5 These service departments 
managed activities such as buying, marketing, transport and advertising, and gave the 
company a great deal of internal capacity to co-ordinate the vertical chain of value-adding 
activities. 
 For frozen food to be developed successfully into a mass consumer good it was necessary 
both to create new markets, upstream and downstream of production, and to put in place 
mechanisms through which these additional market transactions could be effected. Upstream 
markets were required in which a sufficient volume of raw materials could be delivered in a 
way that enabled the process of quick freezing to be applied within a short space of time. 
Downstream markets were required to store, handle and transport the frozen produce, and 
retailers were required who were equipped with the necessary storage facilities. Finally, a 
demand among consumers for the novel product needed to be created and satisfied. Only 
when all of these markets were in place would it be possible to reap the potential benefits of 
the new technology. 
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 As a company with a history of backward vertical integration, Unilever‟s initial approach 
to the procurement of raw materials featured a degree of self provision. Birds Eye began its 
processing activities in Britain at Great Yarmouth in conjunction with another Unilever 
subsidiary, MacFisheries Ltd., a Scottish trawler and fish retailing business for whom Birds 
Eye produced frozen herring (Wilson, 1954; Fieldhouse, 1978, pp. 31-32). During this early 
phase, two more Unilever subsidiaries, Batchelors Peas Ltd. and Poulton & Noel Ltd, 
undertook freezing on behalf of Birds Eye before the company opened two further factories 
of its own in Lowestoft (fish and vegetables) and Kirkby (meat products, vegetables and fish) 
in 1949 and 1950. As sales expanded during the 1950s further factories were acquired in 
Grimsby, Eastbourne and Hull between 1957 and 1959. In tandem with this expansion of 
productive capacity, Birds Eye entered the broiler chicken industry in 1958, quickly building 
up its capacity to around 20 farms, and in 1965 it acquired a controlling interest in North 
Eastern Fish Industries Ltd. to provide a direct source of Newfoundland cod.
6
 This policy of 
direct backward vertical integration was not utilised in respect of the procurement of the 
vegetables required for processing. Nevertheless, Birds Eye did develop quasi-backward 
vertical integration through the use of annually negotiated forward contracts with local 
farmers, to whom they gave assurances of short term renewal and, in many cases, provided 
seed
7
 (Wilson, 1968).  
 The process of creating the necessary markets downstream from the production process 
was much more complicated and required many of the resources that Unilever had developed 
earlier to support its other food businesses. Distribution and handling of the products was 
placed into the hands of the refrigerated division of the company‟s transportation subsidiary, 
SPD,
8
 who utilised its national network of depots and vehicles in a closely co-ordinated 
operation with Birds Eye‟s own sales division. Only in parts of the country too remote to 
operate economically were independent wholesalers integrated into the company‟s frozen 
  10 
food distribution system, and these wholesalers were prevented by contract from distributing 
the rival brands of direct competitors. More intractable was the effective creation of markets 
for the final product. Although Unilever operated a chain of retail stores under the 
MacFisheries name, a far greater volume of sales was required than this collection of stores 
would allow. However, in the early 1950s few retailers were equipped with the type of 
refrigerated containers necessary to display frozen foodstuff and in 1953
9
 Birds Eye 
persuaded two manufacturers of refrigerated equipment, Prestcold and Frigidaire, to design 
and market “open-top” display cabinets for use by retailers. In return, the company agreed to 
limit its sales to those retailers who installed such devices (Monopolies Commission, 1976). 
Later, Birds Eye developed a policy of leasing refrigerated cabinets to some of its more 
important retail customers on condition that the equipment was used for stocking Birds Eye 
products or other products which did not directly rival those of Birds Eye.
10
 Meanwhile 
consumers were bombarded with an array of Birds Eye brand propaganda, price incentives 
and in-store inducements in an effort to alter their purchasing patterns. 
 In pioneering the mass consumer market for frozen foodstuffs, therefore, Birds Eye found 
it necessary to take direct responsibility for creating the wide variety of markets that were 
required before households could be offered the product in sufficient quantities to make 
manufacturing worthwhile. The pattern established by Birds Eye tended to be followed by the 
two main rival firms who developed as competitors in the branded consumer markets during 
the 1960s, Ross Group Ltd. and Findus Ltd. (a subsidiary of Nestlé). Management of the 
supply chain in each case was extensive and both companies developed integrated 
distribution operations, although in the case of Findus this was a joint venture with J. Lyons 
& Co. Ltd., whilst their links with independent wholesalers were made under conditions of 
exclusivity. However, this pattern of integrated provision supported by strong brand 
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advertising became increasingly vulnerable during the 1960s as new forms of organization 
and market segments emerged. 
 
4. Vertical Disintegration in the Frozen Food Chain 
 
Three developments served to change the organizational structure of the frozen food industry 
during the 1960s and 70s. One of these concerned the rapid growth in demand for frozen food 
by the catering trade which led to a pronounced bifurcation of the frozen food industry. The 
other two were brought about by increased competition in the market for frozen food to 
households and these involved the development of product differentiation and market 
segmentation on the one hand and the advancing power of multiple retailers on the other. 
 Increased use of frozen food within the catering trade had the effect of neutralising the 
advantages of proprietary brands. By reducing the fixed overhead costs associated with 
advertising and packaging, the expansion of demand amongst caterers allowed firms with 
relatively modest turnover much greater scope to enter the industry. These changes also 
facilitated a broadening of the distribution arrangements within the frozen food industry. 
Whereas the retailing sector had been supplied through manufacturers‟ own distribution 
companies or through exclusive deals with independent wholesalers, the growth of small 
scale manufacturers serving the catering trade encouraged the establishment of companies 
specialising in the provision of processing, storage and distribution services to frozen food 
manufacturers. 
 Two particular service companies developed in this area; public cold store companies and 
specialised distributors of frozen foods. The larger cold storage companies, such as Christian 
Salvesen, Union Cold Storage and Frigoscandia, tended to be integrated concerns that also 
provided processing and distribution services. Indeed, as the role of independent suppliers 
expanded, so the freezing capacity of these large storage and distribution companies began to 
  12 
rival those of the proprietary branded manufacturers.
11
 Among the distribution companies 
that began to enter the frozen food business in the 1960s were firms such as W.B. Pellew 
Harvey and J. Muirhead (a subsidiary of BOC) that developed their own brands and engaged 
in co-packing arrangements with domestic and foreign processors who lacked sufficient 
capacity of their own to market proprietary brands directly. In some cases the physical 
distribution of these products was undertaken by independent transportation companies under 
contract. Yet more distribution companies were set up by foreign manufacturers of frozen 
food, such as the Norwegian Frionor and the French Bonduelle company, to serve the UK 
distribution needs of their parent companies. This expansion of distribution facilities for 
frozen foods allowed a number of manufacturers with a much more specialised range of 
products to enter the industry. These included agricultural co-operatives that were formed for 
the purpose of processing fruit and vegetables, and a number of small manufacturing 
concerns - mainly subsidiaries of larger food processors - that specialised in manufacturing 
products within a defined segment of the market (vegetables, fish, meat products and fruit  
and confectionery) or in some cases specialise in a single product such as frozen potato chips 
(fries) or pizzas. 
 The arrangements for the retailing of frozen food also helped to speed up the process of 
vertical disintegration in the industry. Within the small-scale segment of grocery retailing, the 
need to provide for relatively small orders led to the development of cash and carry 
wholesalers who acted as intermediaries between the distributing wholesalers and the 
retailers. By the mid-1970s, for example, 60 per cent of greengrocers carried a small range of 
frozen food (Monopolies Commission, 1976). Whilst this trend tended to increase the 
availability of the main proprietary brands of frozen food, a parallel development in the 
distribution chain - promoted by the very rapid growth in sales of home freezers during the 
late 1960s and early 1970s - acted in the opposite direction. As consumers increased their 
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own capacity to store frozen foods, the average value of their purchases of the products rose 
considerably. In response a number of home freezer centres were opened in Britain, led in 
1968 by the Bejam Group, which combined the sale of home freezers with the retailing of 
bulk packs of frozen foods. The advent of home freezer centres offered a much improved 
facility to the smaller manufacturers of frozen food who, as a result, were able to reduce their 
distribution costs whilst at the same time obtaining increased sales for their products. 
 The growth of home freezer centres enabled the industry to overcome the increasing 
constraint on sales in the retail sector which resulted from the limited shelf space available in 
supermarkets. During the 1960s these leading multiple retailers gained an increasing hold 
over grocery retailing
12
 and, as a result, accounted for an increasing share of the sales of 
Birds Eye‟s products (see Table 1). In response to this development, Birds Eye began to offer 
discounts to the large multiples relating to turnover and allocation of shelf space. These 
discounts acted as entry barriers to rival suppliers who were attempting to gain sales through 
supermarkets and the Monopolies Commission report of 1976 ordered Birds Eye to end them 
on the proviso that other manufacturers firms also ceased to utilise such a strategy. However, 
the main threat to the proprietary brands in supermarkets arose less from rival manufacturers 
than from the multiple retailers themselves. As in other product lines, supermarkets 
increasingly sought to introduce their own label brands of goods into their freezer cabinets 
during the 1960s and, led by J. Sainsbury and Marks & Spencer, the multiples‟ own brands 
had made significant inroads into the frozen food market by the early 1970s. Although Birds 
Eye resisted the pressure to re-label their own products for retailers,
13
 other manufacturers 
proved more willing to adopt an own label strategy.
14
 Findus, for example, who supplied 
products for Sainsbury, Marks & Spencer and other leading multiples, saw the proportion of 
their gross sales (in value terms) accounted for by retailers‟ own label products rise from 
under 7 per cent in 1971 to 16.5 per cent just three years later. The beginnings of the own-
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label industry initiated a revolution (F&CF, 1998, p. 10) which was to be the turning point in 
the relationship between manufacturers and retailers (Morelli, 1999).
15
  
 
Table 1: Birds Eye Total Sales to Different Types of Customer by Value, 1970 & 1973 
 
Customer 1970 
(%) 
1973 
(%) 
“Top twenty” retail customers 27.6 31.9 
Other retail stores 53.5 48.9 
Home freezer centres n.a.  1.5 
Individual home freezer owners n.a.  1.0 
Caterers and other buyers 10.8  8.7 
Independent wholesellers  8.0  8.0 
 
Source: Monopolies Commission, Frozen Foodstuffs, p. 24. 
 
 
 In the two decades spanning the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s, therefore, the frozen food 
industry in Britain had grown both in size and complexity. Whilst at the outset only a firm 
with the degree of vertical control over the chain of production such as Unilever could 
assemble the various components required to raise output to a viable level, by the 1970s a 
whole raft of firms, small and large, had developed an interest in the market. And although 
the manufacturing basis of the industry, at least as far as the household sector was concerned, 
still remained a classic oligopoly, the balance of power within the value adding chain was 
now shifting towards the retailers. Nevertheless, given the strength of the reputation that two 
decades of continuous advertising had given their proprietary brands, the frozen food 
manufacturers continued to control at least this one important lever of competitive power.
16
 
With the advent of chilled ready meals, however, an important segment of the processed food 
industry was about to be turned completely on its head. 
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5. The Chilled Revolution 
 
It was the large manufacturers of frozen foods who first introduced ready meals as they 
sought to increase the value-added component of their product range and respond to the 
opportunities presented by a variety of demographic changes, notably increased rates of 
female employment (Christensen, Rama and von Tunzelmann, n.d., p. 33). From the 
introduction of TV dinners by Birds Eye in 1969 (Key Note, 1998, p. 12), an increasingly 
sophisticated variety of products found their way into the freezer cabinets of British 
supermarkets and other retailers during the 1970s. A list of Birds Eye retail products in 1975 
contained a wide range of culinary temptations from the traditional British staple dishes of 
lamb casserole and cod and chips through to quasi-exotic Asian offerings such as sweet and 
sour chicken and prawn curry. Unfortunately for the manufacturers, the process of freezing 
and reconstituting these meals in many cases had a detrimental affect on both the texture and 
the flavour of the food.
17
 If these dishes could be preserved by means of chilling rather than 
freezing, then the final product that reached the consumer‟s dinner table could be much 
improved. However, the logistical difficulties involved in such a process were formidable, 
since the maximum period of time that could elapse between production and final 
consumption of such products was a matter of days rather than weeks. Although it might be 
possible to charge a premium price for such dishes, unless supply and demand could be co-
ordinated with unprecedented accuracy the cost in wastage would far outweigh any potential 
benefits to be gained from the higher profit margin. This need for detailed co-ordination 
meant that a significant element of competitive advantage was now transferred to retailers. 
 In Britain, the chilled ready meals market was pioneered by the multiple retailer Marks 
and Spencer. Their decision to specialise in high quality fresh and convenience food products 
(Davies, 1999), culminating in the provision of premium-priced chilled ready meals, was to 
have important consequences for the management of the supply chain and for retailer‟s 
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relationships with suppliers in general (Whitehead, 1994). The long-term strategy of Marks 
and Spencer to differentiate on quality meant that it had been vital for them to forge close 
relationships with suppliers in order to guarantee standards. This history of collaborative 
product development with suppliers proved crucial in enabling Marks and Spencer to exploit 
a latent demand for pre-prepared „fresh‟ ready-meals during the 1980s (Kumar, 1996).18 
Subsequently similar collaborative arrangements were cultivated by other retailers in the UK 
grocery market, led by J. Sainsbury, as they successfully sought to emulate the strategy of 
Marks and Spencer. 
Managing the logistics of product distribution had emerged as a major objective of the 
grocery multiples from the 1970s. During this period, for example, Sainsbury pioneered the 
development of their own dedicated Regional Distribution Centres (RDCs) as an intermediate 
stage in the distribution process. These RDCs were owned by one of the growing number of 
specialist distributors but were operated on Sainsbury‟s behalf through a process of 
subcontracting.
19
 Transportation of products from the RDCs to the stores was then largely 
undertaken directly by Sainbury‟s own fleet of vehicles (McKinnon, 1989). In a similar 
move, Marks & Spencer formed a joint venture with the distribution arm of BOC in order to 
distribute its chilled produce. By the 1990s, the RDC pattern had become established with 
British retailers, although they increasingly contracted out the operation of the centres. More 
recently, retailers have begun to operate Primary Consolidation Centres (PCCs) to which 
smaller manufacturers are able to deliver increasingly small batch-driven loads prior to their 
transfer to the RDCs.
20
 Through the use of EDI systems, retailers are thus able to manage the 
supply chain from beginning to end. 
 The principal technologies that drove the development of the chilled ready meals sector 
were not standardised production technologies, but generic IT systems and software which 
enabled the close co-ordination of independent firms. Control over logistics was a 
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prerequisite for the detailed management along the chill chain that the development of a 
viable market for chilled ready meals required. The critical step in the process, however, 
came with the introduction of computer controlled systems of inventory management during 
the 1980s. Given the ability that electronic point of sale (EPOS) systems gave retailers to 
record and replenish the limited space on chilled shelves, a system of stock management was 
put in place that enabled Marks & Spencer to exploit the latent demand for chilled ready 
meals among its customer base. 
 The gradual adoption of EPOS replenishment systems in the early 1980s, and scanning 
technology in the mid-1980s allowed the supply chain to be managed in a more efficient 
way.
21
 Grocery retailers, constrained by the perishable nature of their produce, were the first 
to  move from inventory based systems to customer driven systems (MacDonald, 1994). The 
ability of being able to use Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) between organizations in real 
time is a key feature of being able to manage inter-firm systems of co-ordination (Hughes and 
Merton, 1996; Maltz, and Srivastava, 1997; Mason-Jones and Towill, 1998; Abernathy et al, 
1999). This ability to manage the supply-chain allowed retailers to switch to customer 
demand-driven
22
 systems of replenishment (Smart, 1995; Winters, 1996; Fernie and Pierrel, 
1996; Ody and Newman, 1991), and encouraged the expansion of their control backwards 
down the supply-chain. These factors led to a boom in the 1980s of third-party contractors to 
handle distribution (Buck, 1990; Fernie 1997; Bourlakis, 1998), and the domination of the 
supply chain by retailers at the expense of manufacturing firms, who saw their distribution 
services decimated (Whiteoak, 1993). 
 The changes in supply chain management have created different forms of organization to 
that observed in the frozen food industry, leading to a system of IT co-ordinated inter-firm 
networks (see J. Sainsbury (1999b) for a technical look at the management of supplier 
chains). Using J. Sainsbury as a representative example, retailers were able to sell chilled 
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ready meals in small batches as a direct result of their control of the supply-chain. Having 
developed subcontracted distribution facilities during the 1970s, Sainsbury began to absorb 
this function directly into their own operations by building and managing their own RDCs 
during the 1990s. By moving their direct management backwards into the chain of logistics 
(Fernie and Sparks, 1998), Sainsbury were able to gather information regarding the role of 
wholesaling much more effectively and to introduce their own computer-controlled stock 
management systems into this aspect of the value chain. The move also enabled the company 
to contract directly the services of distribution companies allowing them to wrest control over 
the supply chain still further, often at the expense of the manufacturers who were obliged to 
relinquish some of their responsibilities (Cooper, Browne and Peters, 1994, p. 113). As a 
result, Sainsbury were able to unbundle many of the costs of services that were supplied by 
wholesaling subcontractors and gain much more precise information over a variety of costs 
that had previously been beyond their purview. 
 More recently still, increasingly sophisticated information systems provided by 
customised inventory management software have allowed retailers such as Sainsbury to move 
still further towards the indirect control over the value-chain. The management of the 
distribution centres owned by Sainsbury have in many cases been subcontracted to third 
parties in a system that effectively involves reverse-franchising. The retailer retains direct 
ownership of the asset (warehouse) and the computer-controlled stock management system, 
but subcontracts out the operation and various other support services that the physical 
management of the asset requires. Thus the integrated information system underpins and 
provides control over an organizational structure which actually constitutes a network of 
independent firms revolving around the hub played by the retailer‟s head office. In 
Sainsbury‟s terms, this arrangement represents the inverse of the concept of “hollowing-out”, 
since it allows the company to maintain control over the critical system-wide information 
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whilst enabling them to relinquish direct responsibility for its management.23 And whilst this 
arrangement requires the management of many times the number of discrete transactions that 
would be involved in conventional subcontracting, the costs of managing these transactions 
has been sharply reduced by the development of computerised information management 
systems: thus an integrated information network has begun to replace a corporate hierarchy as 
the efficient method of managing large numbers of discrete transactions in the Information 
Age. 
 
Development through co-ordination 
 
The pricing and positioning strategy adopted by Marks & Spencer towards the marketing of 
chilled ready meals saw them promoted as a substitute for restaurant food and, in particular, 
for take-away meals. The products therefore featured attractive packaging and were marketed 
as high quality premium priced products. Persuading its existing customers to purchase 
chilled ready meals does not seem to have posed significant problems for Marks & Spencer. 
The company had already developed a range of chilled products such as meat pies and 
quiches under its own St Michael brand name and expanding this range into full meals, or 
meal centres, was a logical step which required marketing only at point of sale. Indeed, rather 
than using advertising to inform customers about the new products, Marks & Spencer were 
far more concerned with the issue of obtaining information about the kind of products 
consumers would like to try; thus shifting from one-way to two-way product information 
flows. A proprietary chargecard scheme was introduced that enabled the company to obtain 
more detailed information relating to individual buying patterns and this group of customers 
were invited to special in-store events to allow the company further insights into current 
consumer trends. 
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 As high value products, the success of chilled ready meals critically depended upon the 
continuous development of new product ranges and this, in turn, required the pooling 
together of widely distributed sources of knowledge. Sainsbury, who followed Marks & 
Spencer‟s lead into chilled ready meals during the late 1980s (Fernie and Pierrel, 1996), 
assembled new product development teams that included employees from food 
manufacturing and packaging companies as well as their own staff. These teams monitored 
purchasing patterns and studied eating trends in restaurants before using the information 
gained to innovate a new range of products.  
 Despite having no manufacturing capability of their own, British retailers have been able 
to compete head-to-head with branded manufacturers, such as Unilever (Fernie, 1997, p. 391; 
Fernie and Pierrel, 1996; Senker, 1986). In new product development (NPD), for example, 
British retailers are unique in having large internal departments of NPD and food technology 
and hygiene to develop products. Lacking direct access to manufacturing facilities, these 
teams developed products in collaboration with suppliers who were, perforce, obliged to 
absorb directly many of the costs incurred. 
 The chilled food manufacturing companies with whom Marks & Spencer and Sainsbury 
collaborated were generally not the earlier pioneers of frozen food, but mainly smaller firms 
who were able to engage in systems of batch production. For the retailer, the advantage of 
being able to utilise these small manufacturers is the rapid and flexible development of new 
products. For the manufacturer, meanwhile, the retailer can supply ideas as well as technical 
help and access to its network of specialists. This activity has produced specialist food 
companies who are essentially part of the supermarket sector‟s value chain.24 For example, 
Noon Food Products is supplier of chilled Indian-style ready meals to Sainsbury (and other 
retailers) but does not undertake the branding, marketing or distribution of its products. 
  21 
Despite this reliance upon their customers to undertake this function, Noon Food Products 
had generated annual sales of £25m (Key Note, 1998). 
 Together with companies supplying ingredients, these firms were given responsibility for 
developing new recipes for dishes that would be suitable for chilling and re-heating. Of 
particular importance in supporting the growth in demand for chilled ready meals was the 
rapid expansion in household ownership of microwave ovens. This had consequences not 
merely for the manufacture of ready meals, but also for the forms of packaging used. Indeed, 
innovation in packaging contributes the main element of propriety technology that has been 
instrumental in the development of chilled ready meals. Microwavable meals necessitated the 
development of containers featuring different degrees of “transparency” in terms of their 
ability to transmit, reflect and absorb microwaves. This led to the innovation of “active”25 
forms of packaging which are able to control or influence the effects of microwave heating. 
Thus new product development in the chilled ready meals segment has involved the 
formation of collaborative teams drawing on a wide range of information and knowledge. 
However, with access to the critical information on consumer purchasing patterns and control 
over the allocation of shelf space for products, it is the retailers who maintain leverage over 
the process of product development and it is they who stand to gain most from the flexibility 
to change suppliers which such collaborative, rather than formally integrated, systems of 
organization facilitate. This shift in power along the supply-chain reflects the ability of 
information rich retailers to identify and assimilate control over high value-adding activities.  
And unlike the food manufacturers, whose standardised products required large scale 
advertising support to launch, the food retailers were able to market their products directly 
and at low-cost in-store. 
 The ability of retailers such as Marks & Spencer, Sainsbury and Tesco to exploit the 
market for chilled ready meals on the strength of their own label brands has been an 
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important factor reinforcing the increasing relative strength of the multiple retailers over the 
food manufacturers (see Table 2). Indeed in the case of Tesco this emphasis on quality and 
high added value was instrumental in enabling the firm to drastically improve its market 
image during the 1990s.  By 1997 the sales of chilled ready meals from these three large 
retailers made up 80 per cent of the total sales of such products, with Marks & Spencer alone 
accounting for 48 per cent (Key Note, 1998, Table 14).  
 
Table 2: Relative Shares of the Ready-Meals Market 
 
Ready Meals Market Market Share (%) 
Frozen Ready Meals, of which: 53%  
Branded Manufacturers share of frozen market  80% 
Retailer Own-Brand share of frozen market  20% 
Chilled Ready Meals, of which: 47%  
Branded Manufacturers share of chilled market  5% 
Retailer Own-Brand share of chilled market  95% 
 
Note: One manufacturer (Birds Eye Walls Ltd) has 26% of the frozen market share.  Three 
retailers (Marks & Spencer, J. Sainsbury and Tesco) account for 80% of the chilled market 
(48%: 16%: 16%).  
Source: Table derived from figures in Ready Meals, Mintel, 1998. 
 
 
The market for chilled ready meals illustrates with particular clarity the way in which 
more efficient systems of information management, resulting from the development of ICT, 
have raised the ability of retailers to exert control over the value chain in the food industry. 
However, unlike the earlier forms of control exercised by large manufacturers, based on 
vertically integrated organizational structures, the multiple retailers operate through 
management systems that take the form of inter-firm networks. This can be seen quite clearly 
in the case of new product development. Inter-firm collaboration takes the form of long term 
strategic alliances with companies whose core competencies are complementary to those of 
the retailers. The key consideration in this case resides in the mutual benefits that can be 
gained by all the participating firms through a process of ongoing collaboration. The inter-
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firm alliance thus takes the form of multi-disciplinary teams whose common objective and 
continuous interaction help to facilitate mutual trust. However, the critical information which 
determines the commercial success of this collaborative process is the market-making role 
performed by the retailer and it is the control of this information that allows leverage over the 
network as a whole. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The technologies of the Second Industrial Revolution spawned and supported the 
development of mass production industries. One of the great strengths of Chandler‟s work 
lies in its recognition that these technological changes would most readily bear fruit if the 
vast increase in the volume of production occurring at the plant level were accompanied by 
organizational innovations in systems of management. The large scale American business 
enterprise constituted the institution through which this enhanced level of management could 
be brought into effect. Large firms played a variety of roles in the development of the 
American economy during the first half of the twentieth century. For example they 
marshalled together the capital investment required to support new technological 
breakthroughs and they formed the enterprises in which the art of management - and many 
modern business skills - could be disseminated to a wide body of new white collar workers. 
 In his book The Visible Hand (1977), Chandler places his emphasis on the role played by 
these large corporations in replacing the market mechanism as a means of economic co-
ordination. Such a role was considered to be important whenever transactions costs acted to 
reduce the ability of the price mechanism to perform its co-ordinating role efficiently - a 
situation that arose whenever the quality of the market-based information flowing between 
economic agents was unreliable. Thus the administrative hierarchies of large business 
corporations arose as a response to problems of information within those industries whose 
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operations and output had been rapidly transformed by the process of technological change. 
However, it is clear that the transformations wrought by the Second Industrial Revolution did 
not only act to undermine the price mechanism by generating transactions costs, they also 
necessitated the formation of entirely new markets - or markets capable of transacting much 
larger volumes of business - both upstream and downstream from the production process. 
Management hierarchies were a successful innovation, at least in part, because they provided 
firms with the ability to generate and serve these new markets by creating specialised 
functional departments to deal with market and distribution type activities such as sales, 
purchasing, traffic and advertising. Thus rather than viewing the administrative hierarchies of 
large business enterprises purely as a substitute for the market mechanism, it is important to 
recognise also the role that firms played in facilitating the development of entirely new 
markets. 
 In his more recent work, Chandler (1992a; 1992b) has identified the limitations of 
Williamson‟s transaction-based approach in defining the essential nature of the firm, but has 
tended to place his emphasis on the physical and human asset base of the firm (i.e. the stock 
of firm-specific knowledge which the development of the modern industrial enterprise 
undoubtedly served to expand and which in turn enabled it to broaden the activities within its 
managerial compass). Where this revision fails to diverge fundamentally from Williamson‟s 
transaction cost approach is in the contention that firms and markets constitute alternative 
systems of resource allocation and co-ordination.  Hence, Chandler (1992a, p. 489) argues 
merely that it is “the specific nature of the facilities and skills [of the firm that] are more 
important than bounded rationality and opportunism to the shaping of decisions as to 
internalising transactions and, therefore, in determining the boundaries between firm and 
market.” In the Information Age, however, it is the role played by inter-firm networks in 
blurring the very boundary between firm and market itself that becomes the key feature 
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(Ebers, 1997). Now, firms and markets no longer stand in simple counterpoint to one another, 
but rather utilise mechanisms such as ICT systems and relational contracts to form quite 
different forms of corporate architecture (Kay, 1993). Some of these mechanisms, involving 
long-term trust relationships for example, hark back to earlier systems of economic co-
ordination (Lane and Bachmann, 1998); those dependent upon the use of information 
management systems, by contrast, are purely a creation of Information Age technologies. 
 Viewing the primary economic function of the firm in a market economy as that of 
intermediation, following Casson (1997b), enables the question of transactions costs to be 
placed in the wider context of information management. Firms in the United States during the 
Industrial Age gathered information not merely concerning the systems of mass production 
that they pioneered, but also about the marketing channels that were needed to ally mass 
production with systems of mass distribution. Utilising this market-based information 
frequently required the firm to take responsibility for co-ordinating the various functions 
along the value chain and thus led in many industries to a process of vertical integration. 
However, such vertical integration would only endure if the new markets that had been 
created in this way could not be served efficiently by other firms or if the problems of 
transactions costs that arose from unreliable information flows could not be dealt with in 
some alternative fashion. If either of these two conditions broke down then the industry was 
liable to experience a subsequent period of vertical disintegration. 
 In the case of frozen food the impact of technical innovation occurred at the production 
stage and required corresponding changes in the provision of raw materials, in the systems of 
distribution, wholesaling and retailing, and in the patterns of household consumption. The 
creation of these various new markets was therefore a prerequisite for the successful 
exploitation of the technology of quick freezing. Unilever and its subsidiary companies were 
well placed to co-ordinate the flows of information needed to effect these new processes of 
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market intermediation. Once the new production technology had been successfully 
established, however, opportunities arose for this process of intermediation to be undertaken 
by other actors operating at different stages of the vertical chain. In particular, during the 
1960s and 1970s the multiple retailers were able to alter the mix of information that reached 
the final consumer by adding their own label products to the range of proprietary brands 
manufactured by the large food processors and, by such means, gain increasing influence 
over the information flows that operated within the industry as a whole. 
 The position of the retailers was further strengthened by the technical innovations that 
ushered in the Information Age. Enhanced systems of information management gave retailers 
who invested in the appropriate technology far greater control over the process of inventory 
management and allowed them to introduce products featuring much shorter shelf lives such 
as in the case of chilled ready meals. With improved systems of stock management and easier 
access to current consumer buying patterns and eating trends, retailers were also able to 
initiate a process of continuous product innovation by pooling knowledge with food 
manufacturers and packaging companies through the use of strategic alliances featuring 
multi-disciplinary teams. Competitive advantage in the chilled ready meals sector has been 
gained less through technical advances in the process of production, and more by retailers‟ 
ability to manage the co-ordination of their supply chain, even when competitors have access 
to the same suppliers and contractors. The successful innovation of chilled ready meals 
depended on the information management facilities that arose as a result of the ICT 
revolution, but it did not require large investments in the creation of new markets. Rather, it 
had the effect of changing the nature of the existing processes of intermediation that retailers 
previously engaged in. Increasing use of ICT enabled the outsourcing of the management 
services in warehousing and logistics but without sacrificing control over the information 
flows that stemmed from them. It also encouraged increasingly collaborative links with 
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complementary firms within the vertical value-adding chain to allow pooling of 
complementary sources of knowledge to take place which, whilst it operated to the mutual 
benefit of all the parties involved, did not oblige retailers to surrender the critical information 
regarding patterns of consumer demand. And, crucially, ICT supported a shift from one-way 
to two-way processes of information exchange with customers, allowing future purchasing 
trends to be anticipated and accommodated. 
 Although the chilled-ready meals market is primarily a British phenomenon - and the UK 
grocery retail market clearly exhibits distinctive national characteristics (Morelli, 1998b) - 
there are two factors which make a study of the market more generally relevant. First, the 
relationships described in the chilled-ready meals sector are to some degree being replicated 
abroad by the firms in the UK case study. Sainsbury, for example, through control of the US 
east coast retailer Shaw‟s,26 is attempting to leverage it‟s competitive advantage through 
supplier relations, own-brand development and centralised supply-chain and inventory 
control. In 2000, Shaw‟s own brand accounted for 40% of turnover,27 and ready-cooked 
meals and prepared foods have also been successfully introduced into the market.
28
 Second, 
the third-party contractors who have been instrumental in pioneering the U.K. supply chain 
developments (Fernie, 1995), such as Excel, BOC, Christian Salvesen and Tibbet & Britten 
(formerly SPD) are rolling-out the technology of ICT supply-chain management into the 
European and US fast-moving consumer-goods markets. Offering their services as logistics 
chain managers, these companies enable firms without sophisticated ICT capabilities to join 
the supplier-chain and hence the infrastructure supporting the relationships described in this 
paper, both in terms of control and innovation networks, is in the process of becoming more 
generalised. 
 In summary, therefore, the transformation of production processes that occurred across a 
range of manufacturing industries during the Industrial Age generated new and more complex 
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requirements for the processes of intermediation as well as for the production systems 
themselves. The development of hierarchical organizations provided firms with the ability to 
oversee directly many of these new tasks and to create the markets that supported them. In 
contrast, the advent of the Information Age has tended not so much to require the creation of 
markets de novo but has rather altered the nature of existing relationships of intermediation in 
ways that have facilitated a much wider collection of organizational forms. 
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Notes 
                                         
1 Our analysis of the frozen food industry is developed from primary and secondary sources, as referenced. 
The contemporary study of the chilled food industry has been informed by a series of semi-structured interviews 
from actors along the value chain, (including retailer new product development managers, retailer logistics 
managers, third-party logistics contractor managers and trade association officials with a global overview of the 
industry). Due to the closely-knit nature of the UK food industry, several actors interviewed also had previous 
experience with manufacturing companies. Interlocking testimony was used to maximise the data from the 
actors interviewed. The interviews were important to examine in detail the operation of network linkages within 
the chilled ready-meals. Interview material was supplemented by a study of the available literature and industry 
information from public sources. Owing to the confidential and sensitive nature of information in the grocery-
retail and supplier sectors, our industry sources have not been attributed directly. 
2See Casson and Cox (1997) for an examination of how the process of intermediation contributes to an 
economic theory of networks. 
3 Other writers, cf. Fransman (1998), have also noted that the Coasian approach to the firm is one based 
essentially on information problems and have contrasted this with approaches originating in the work of Nelson 
and Winter (1982) which view the firm as a repository of knowledge. 
4 A subsidiary of General Foods, the Frosted Foods Company Inc., had first set up a British operation in 
June 1938 and two months later this subsidiary set up Birds Eye Food Ltd. Unilever‟s interest in the operation 
began in 1943 when it acquired shares in the British registered Frosted Foods Ltd. In 1951 Unilever became the 
majority shareholder in Birds Eye, and full ownership was achieved in 1957 (Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission, 1976, p. 21-2). 
5 The advantages of managerial economies of scope, and the persistence of these functional divisions in 
Unilever has been outlined by Maljers  (1992). 
6 Eventually direct control over the provision of chicken and fish was abandoned as overproduction and 
falling prices during the late 1960s and early 1970s made such investments uneconomical. 
7 Seed was supplied to ensure standardisation and for quality control. The arrangement also ensured 
exclusivity for Birds Eye, and meant that this activity was essentially quasi-integrated into the Unilever 
structure. The response of growers was to form committees such as the Processed Vegetable Growers 
Association to negotiate with Unilever on their behalf.  
8 SPD (Speedy, Prompt Delivery) was developed from the acquisition and development of several contract 
haulage firms. In 1984 Unilever decided to divest itself of it logistics division, and John Harvey Jones (who had 
been instrumental to the acquisition of Tibbet and Britten into the group in 1969) led a management buyout of 
the group to become the Tibbet and Britten Group (T&B).  
9 The standards for refrigerated storage in retail were agreed in 1953, (F&CF, 1998). 
10 Large retailers, such as J. Sainsbury, were quick to begin to develop their own refrigerated cabinets in 
order to display a larger selection of stock (Bridget Williams, Sainsbury‟s Archivist, personal correspondence). 
This capacity eventually led to the ability of retailers to offer own-brand products, as discussed in the main text. 
11It was estimated that by 1973 Salvesen‟s freezing capacity amounted to around one-third that of Birds 
Eye. (Monopolies and Mergers Commission, 1976, p. 14). 
12In 1961 multiple retailers with 10 or more stores accounted for 26.9 per cent of grocery retail sales in the 
United Kingdom; by 1971 their share had risen to 44.3 per cent. (Morelli, 1998a, Table 1). 
13 Although Birds Eye did re-label products for the generic (unbranded) market (F&CF, 1998). 
14 The first own-label frozen food produced for retailers own brands was frozen fish, supplied by Ross (then 
a marginal manufacturer in Frozen foods) in 1957 (F&CF, 1998, p. 13). 
15 The position of own-brands within the UK market, as high quality / high value products, has been seen as 
a key factor in explaining the different profit structures within UK grocery retail. For an examination of 
international retail margins see Fernie and Pierrel (1996) and Burt and Sparks (1997). The Office of Fair 
Trading has examined the profitability of UK retailers (Graham and Steele, 1997) and Morelli (1999) makes 
some suggestions as to the welfare considerations. Despite the British sector being more developed, the drivers 
in the food processing sector are acknowledged to be similar in the European and North American markets (Keh 
and Park, 1997; Kumar, 1997; Geulph Food Technology, 1999) making the examples based on the UK 
experience especially interesting. 
16 The frozen food market is still dominated by the „big four‟ companies, all subsidiaries of multinational 
firms; Birds Eye Walls Ltd, Nestlé Holdings (UK), Ross Youngs and HJ Heinz Company Ltd UK. In the high 
value-added frozen ready meals segment, for example, Birds Eye has the majority share with 26 per cent of the 
market (Key Note, 1998, p. 20). 
17 This was despite attempts by Birds Eye to improve the perceived quality of ready meals by introducing 
the Menumaster range in the 1980s (Key Note, 1998, p. 12). The Menumaster range was originally introduced 
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for caterers in 1976 (F&CF, 1998, p. 34), reinforcing the link between the frozen catering and customer frozen 
foods divisions in Birds Eye, and shows how developments in catering filtered through to the development of 
consumer products. 
18 Unlike Unilever, who actively supported the introduction of freezer technology in an attempt to enable 
consumers to participate in the frozen food market, Marks and Spencer merely sought to exploit existing but 
unsatisfied demand. 
19 Sainsbury contracted out the operation of its RDCs “lock stock and barrel” in the 1970s for two primary 
reasons. First, the period was one of organised labour unrest, and with inflationary pressures on wages 
increasing industrial action, contracting out removed Sainsbury from labour management problems in 
distribution. Second, the period was one where Sainsbury (and the other large retailers) were using their 
resources to expand the number of outlets and geographic spread. 
20 Very small crate-based deliveries (rather than pallets) can be made by manufacturers to PCCs. Crates can 
accommodate partial boxes, ideal for the delivery of very short shelf-life low-volume products such as ready 
meals. The efficiency therefore does not come from standardised delivery and economies of scale, but in 
accurately matching short-run supply and demand. 
21 The development of these generic IT systems was co-ordinated by the Institute of Grocery Distributors 
(IGD), a trade body founded in 1975 comprised of retailers, manufacturers and distributors (de Angeli, 1995; 
Bamfield, 1994). Indeed, the logistics literature has detailed how retailers have turned around the management 
of the supply chain. The IGD, for example, set-up the Article Numbering Association (ANA) in 1976, which set 
common standards for bar-coding, leading eventually to the adoption of an e-standard in 1997. 
22 Information as to customer buying patterns and trends is gathered from store data and loyalty card 
information. Data warehousing is becoming common in the late 1990s, as retailers continue to gather 
information as to the buying patterns of consumers. Data mining technologies allow them to develop bundles of 
products and promotions to exploit consumer demand (Harvey, 2000). The retailers use this knowledge for 
product development. They are in the sole position to gather this information, and it must be noted that in a 
system of transparent information, this critical information is guarded closely within the organisation.  
23 In order to check the performance of subcontracted services, retailers maintain some fully owned logistics 
support services to facilitate benchmarking, and to reduce the negotiating power of the subcontractors further 
(Chaplen, and Wignall, 1997). 
24 Currently the chilled ready meals manufacture sector is comprised of over 180 firms, ranging from a few 
large companies such as Northern Foods and Hazlewood, to micro-kitchens employing less than five people. 
Grocer (1997). 
25 The importance of packaging in the chilled pre-cooked foods sector emphasises the hygiene issues which 
play an important part in the development of the product (Chilled Food Association, personal correspondence). 
Products which include many ingredients, with differing heating characteristics, and may be either heated by 
oven or microwave, present specific risks. Thus the development the correct form of dual-ovenable (suitable for 
conventional gas, electric and fan ovens as well as microwaves) modified atmosphere packaging is critical (Key 
Note, 1998). Packaging must be co-ordinated not only with the food processor, but with the retailer, who will 
use the packaging as part of their generic own brand marketing strategy. 
26 In 1983 Sainsbury acquired a 20% stake in Shaw‟s, and then a controlling interest in 1987. Since then it 
has acquired several smaller regional supermarket groups, and the Star Markets group in 1999. Consolidating 
the acquisitions into the Shaw‟s group and brand, Shaw‟s is at present the second largest food retailer in New 
England, with 168 stores. 
27 Shaw‟s has some 5,000 own-brand products. Shaw‟s profits have increased from £41m in 1997 to £80m 
in 2000. J Sainsbury (2000).  
28 Chilled ready-meals themselves have not so far been as successful in the US market. Despite this, the 
collaborative arrangements described in the paper are important in developing high quality convenience food 
more suitable for the US market. 
 
 
 
